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PLacinG “riGhTs and LiBerTies in PaWn 
unTiL The deFeaT oF hiTLerisM”: 
Canadian Intelligence Gathering In The 
Second World War
ausTin M. h. WiLLiaMs 
algoMa University college 
aBsTracT
Williams examines RCMP intelligence Bulletins drafted dur-
ing World War Two that have been declassified under the 
Access to Information Act. Williams’ Analysis of the Bulletins 
suggests that the Canadian intelligence gathering apparatus 
underwent a massive expansion during the war. The RCMP 
began investigating people and organizations based upon their 
race, religion, political affiliation or nationalist beliefs. Ulti-
mately, Williams suggests that contemporary tactics mobilized 
against perceived terrorist threats parallel tactics used during 
the Second World War
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In Canada little research is available on the subject of histori-
cal intelligence gathering, hampering study of more recent intelli-
gence documents.1  The few studies available from sources like Steve 
Hewitt, Paul Axelrod, and Reg Whitaker focus almost exclusively 
upon intelligence gathering relationships with politically left lean-
ing organizations and students. Analysis of declassified Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police (RCMP) Bulletins will show that Canada’s first 
dedicated intelligence agency was created due to securitizing pressures 
during the Second World War, and that the actions of this apparatus 
created a powerful reactionary opposition from within the Canadian 
government eventually resulting in the creation of Canada’s human 
rights legislation.  
 Securitization is an ongoing process identified by the Copen-
hagen School of International Relations by which influential groups 
or persons make a “security speech act” identifying an object, place 
or idea that requires additional protection, leading the government 
to invest resources into securing the referent object.2 This process of 
securitization followed during World War Two was spurred forward 
by security speech acts from varied sources, which led to increases in 
the scope and power of the RCMP intelligence apparatus, as well as 
constant redefinition of their mandate. The process of securitizing 
ethnicity, religion and pacifism during World War Two will be eluci-
dated first through a structural analysis of the Bulletins, indicating the 
growing scope of police intelligence gathering based upon changes 
in the form of the documents. This will be followed by an analysis of 
factors determining the instigation of intelligence gathering. Finally 
the processes by which covert influence and public opinion resulted 
in securitization have been discussed, prompting a discussion of rel-
evance to the modern day. 
 The RCMP Intelligence Bulletins were obtained by Gregory 
Kealey through the Access to Information Act in 1984.3 These docu-
ments confidentially updated those with sufficient security clearance 
about criminal enterprises and communist or labor activist subver-
1. Larry Hannant,  “Access to the Inside: An Assessment of ‘Canada’s Security Service: A History’,” Intel-
ligence and National Security 8, no. 3 (1993): 149.
2. Roland Dannreuther, International Security: The Contemporary Agenda (Malden: Polity 2013), 47.
3. Gregory Kealey “The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 
the Public Archives of Canada, and the Access to Information: A Curious Tale,” Labour no. 21  (1988): 
199.
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sion of industry inside Canada from 1920 until after the end of the 
Second World War. These reports were issued initially in 1920 by the 
Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) of the RCMP. The CIB’s man-
date focused on criminal activities, which at the time included work 
stoppages, labor activism and communist party advocacy.4 This was 
included in their mandate because the political left and communists 
were viewed by the established authorities as a threat to their contin-
ued governance, and the security of the commonwealth. Special focus 
on politically left-wing groups such as unions and socialist parties in-
tensified during the interwar period, but the onset of World War Two 
prompted a significant expansion of the scope of RCMP surveillance 
on fascist-aligned other politically unaffiliated individuals and groups, 
as they gradually became viewed as a threat to the continuation of the 
commonwealth as well. The RCMP began spying upon religious, eth-
nic, political, and ideological minorities, even going so far as subscrib-
ing to ethnic publications, printing excerpts of “interesting” articles, 
and infiltrating nationalist events.5 This significant change in police 
tactics has not been assessed textually in the Bulletins or elsewhere, to 
the detriment of Canadian society and historiography.
Dissecting RCMP Bulletins: The Growth and Centralization of 
the Intelligence Apparatus
 The origin and basic stages of growth of the RCMP intelli-
gence gathering apparatus will be demonstrated by tracking the 
changes in the form of the documents from 1920 to the end of World 
War Two. Clear differences in mandate and subject targeting will 
become apparent as the documents move forward in time and the 
intelligence agency is repeatedly dismantled and reformed. The first 
available Bulletins were known under the general title “Notes of the 
Work of the C.I.B. Division.”6 The earliest reports summarized trials, 
detailed the activities of extreme agitators and criminals.7 The race or 
religion of those involved was demonstrably of less concern to the 
RCMP than in World War Two era reports. For instance, the 11th of 
November 1920 Bulletin contained a single sentence which stated the 
4. RCMP, 11 November, 1920 Security Bulletin.
5. RCMP, 1 May 1943, Security Bulletin. 
6. RCMP, 2 January 1920, Security Bulletin.
7. RCMP, 11 November 1920, Security Bulletin.
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existence of seditious and violent Hindu reading material in British 
Columbia.8 It can be inferred this was amended to the greater body of 
the text due to its violent content, and not because the RCMP were 
putting vast resources into gathering intelligence on Hindus. Were 
the RCMP intensely interested in the Hindu religion and its follow-
ers, the documents should have indicated this by repeated and inten-
sive discussions regarding their situation in Canada as the RCMP did 
for many other groups and organizations.  
 This same Bulletin also contains an example of the RCMP 
investigating the race of coal miners, but only after those miners 
began  making threats to sabotage the coal industry in Drumheller.9 
This example, which is one of many, indicates that the RCMP did not 
instigate the investigation based upon the miner’s races, but rather did 
so as part of a routine investigation into criminal threats of sabotage. 
This shows that race was not yet considered a good reason to investi-
gate a person by Canada’s only existing intelligence apparatus.  
By 1923, the focus of the Bulletins was changing from investigating 
outright criminal activity and sabotage to monitoring organizations 
and individuals deemed as radicals by the RCMP or those in the 
Canadian Government directing their efforts. This is evident from the 
alteration of the general title of the documents to “Weekly Summary 
Notes Respecting Revolutionary Organizations and Agitators in 
Canada Report”.10 The structure of the documents during this early 
period is highly variable and minor changes to the title occurred fairly 
frequently; however,  changes in the concerns of officials organizing 
the reports are evident by 1938, when the general name of the Bulle-
tins became “Weekly Summary Report on Communist and Fascist 
Organizations and Agitation in Canada.”11 In the title of the docu-
ments there was no longer any pretence of illegal acts being commit-
ted by those under surveillance instead communist and fascist ideolo-
gies as well as the individuals who advocated for them were stated as 
the scope and focus of intelligence gathering.  
 Within one year of this title change the division issuing the 
Bulletins ceased doing so, and the Civil Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS, not to be confused with the modern organization with the 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid.
10. RCMP, 31 January 1923, Security Bulletin.
11. RCMP, 30th November 1938 Security Bulletin.
74Austin M.H. Williams
same acronym) of the RCMP took over. The general title of the 
documents then changed to “Civil Security Intelligence Summary.”12 
The police themselves admit: “It has been said with some truth that 
by the recent Defence legislation the British people have placed their 
rights and liberties in pawn until the defeat of Hitlerism”.13 Bulletins 
also noted the initiation of “A new conception of police based upon 
urgent needs” after the start of the war, reflecting a rejection of limits 
to the scope of RCMP intelligence gathering.14 From this period the 
content of the Bulletins changed, with new focus upon specific racial 
and religious minorities, peace activists, and other groups that other-
wise defied classification as particularly violent, radical, fascist or left 
leaning politically.15  
 Such fascist, or politically left leaning classification defying 
reports were essentially non-existent in Bulletins before this change, 
but appeared in approximately forty six per cent of the Bulletins 
during World War Two (refer to Table). This expansion coincided 
with the growth of RCMP intelligence personnel from five to more 
than one hundred from 1939-1942.16The lack of easy classification 
led to the temporary inclusion of a table of contents, often consisting 
of three major divisions: Fascism, Communism, and General.17 The 
General category was used as a catch all, sometimes containing 
information on strikes and labour, but more often discussing religious 
and ethnic minorities as in the Bulletin from June 10th.18 Other 
recurring headings relevant to the study being conducted included: 
Enemy Aliens, Ukrainians and Nazism.  The term “enemy alien” has 
evolved its meaning over time, but is always generally understood to 
refer to a person born inside of a country currently at war with the 
country in which they reside. 
 At various times the RCMP also evaluate their own perfor-
mance, tactics and procedures; these evaluations shed light into their 
motivations and the prompts that led to investigation. One example 
of this introspection was the September 30th 1941 Bulletin in which 
12. RCMP, June-Sept 1939, Security Bulletin.
13. RCMP, 26 August 1940, Security Bulletin.
14. RCMP, 26 August 1940, Security Bulletin.
15. Reg Whitaker, Gregory Kealey and Andrew Parnaby, Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from 
the Fenians to Fortress America (Toronto: University of Toronto 2012), 145.
16. Whitaker, Secret Service, 150.
17. RCMP, 23 October 1939 Security Bulletin.
18. RCMP, June 10th 1940 Security Bulletin.
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common ‘misunderstandings’ about the RCMP’s internment policies 
were discussed.19 The article in particular attempted to impress upon 
the reader that the police were not solely responsible for decisions 
regarding internments of non-enemy aliens, as apparently many 
among their ranks believed. Instead, among other things, the article 
describes the process by which persons who are identified as in some 
was subversive or suspect, are thereafter “subjected to a thorough 
police investigation” and if warranted the evidence obtained is sent to 
the Minister of Justice.20 
 Seven Bulletins from before the outbreak of World War Two 
have been included in this study due to their value in terms of denot-
ing structural changes within the Canadian intelligence gathering 
apparatus leading up to the period in question. When considered 
together these documents, though not comprehensive, suggest strong-
ly that during the pre-war period the RCMP did not initiate investi-
gations due singularly to the race or religion of an individual or group 
(refer to Table). Of the seven pre-war documents, one briefly dis-
cussed a communist Spanish loyalist league, another mentioned 
violent anti-imperial Hindus, and the final report before the outbreak 
of World War Two discussed both German and Italian nationals in 
Canada.21 This report was prompted by the fear of sabotage at the 
hands of Canadian fascists in retaliation for the impending war with 
Italy and Germany. This fear was present among all levels of Canadian 
society, including the government, the media and grassroots organiza-
tions. A brief overview of all pre-war Bulletins leaves the impression 
the race of the subject under surveillance is a secondary concern- only 
an issue because they were exhibiting some other extremely subversive 
or violent behaviour. 
 Bulletins during World War Two indicate a noticeable shift in 
surveillance focus, tactics, and targeted groups. During the first forty 
War Bulletins (23rd of October 1939 to February 16, 1941) there were 
eleven issues (twenty seven per cent) that included intelligence on 
eight groups due to their identifiable and somehow objectionable 
ethnicity or religious beliefs (refer to Table). The majority of the 
reports were on individuals from Germany, Italy, and Japan; countries 
19. RCMP, 30 September 1941 Security Bulletin.
20. RCMP, 30 September 1941 Security Bulletin.
21. RCMP, 14 April 1937 Security Bulletin; RCMP, 11 November 1920, Security Bulletin; RCMP, June-
Sept 1939, Security Bulletin.
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at war with the Allies. At least one of these three groups was repre-
sented in eight of the eleven issues referenced, clearly indicating that 
these races were focused upon (refer to Table). Other groups being 
reported upon included the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Ukrainian War 
Veterans Association, and the Ukrainian Nationalist Federation of 
Canada. The expansion of surveillance during this period is indicative 
of the initialization of the securitization of ethnicity during the 
period.  
 Many other groups reported upon were not given as much 
space within the documents, and thus by comparison indicates a 
lower level of interest from police investigators. One of these less 
interesting groups reported upon were Hindu extremists.22 This report 
during the war was likely part of a long standing effort to keep tabs 
on violently anti-imperial propaganda entering the country already 
underway in 1920 (due to a rising Indian independence movement 
abroad), and was not an investigation based primarily upon adhering 
to Hinduism. Another report focused upon the shifting support for 
the war effort among Polish Canadians.23 The report stated that many 
in the Polish community, who at one time supported Canada’s War 
effort, had come to view the Russians as saviors of their mother 
country, resulting in a loss of support. From the information and 
context provided by the document, this particular report appears to 
have been provoked by Polish Canadians making public statements 
which were subversive and anti-Canadian in nature, prompting 
members of the public to report those statements to the authorities, 
forcing the RCMP to investigate according to the new conception of 
police discussed earlier. This lack of focus upon the Polish was further 
indicated by only one follow up report regarding non-political Poles 
during the War, compared to a half dozen for certain other ethnici-
ties.24 
 The history of Ukrainian nationalism was covered in great 
detail in the fortieth wartime Bulletin assessed. The Ukrainian nation-
alist movement was compared to its German and Italian  counter-
parts.25 This comparison between Ukrainian and enemy alien move-
ments is indicative of the subsequent focus that would be placed 
22. RCMP, 6 May 1940, Security Bulletin.
23. RCMP, 23 October 1939, Security Bulletin.
24. RCMP, 1 February 1943, Security Bulletins.
25. RCMP, 23 December 1940, Security Bulletin.
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upon Ukrainians during the later part of the war, similar to that of 
Italians and Germans in the beginning stages (refer to Table). This is 
the first time that such a wide ranging political history of a people 
and organization was undertaken in the documents. To be certain, 
there were politically left and communist Ukrainian organizations 
under study, but these were not particularly the focus of the report. 
From the perspective of the police, Ukrainians may have been per-
ceived as a logical place to begin a concerted expansion of intelligence 
gathering in World War Two since Ukrainians were enemy aliens in 
the First World War and some had been put into internment camps.26 
Police may have feared the large and possibly disgruntled Ukrainian 
body could turn to sabotage or revolt if left unchecked. 
 The final two groups reported upon in this period were 
non-violent politically unaffiliated religious sects. These Bulletins 
indicate a changing attitude regarding investigation and reporting. 
The earliest of the reports, regarding the Doukhobours (a Russian 
religious group of radical pacifists who live mostly in western Cana-
da), indicated the sect suffered from internal structural issues. The 
initial prompt for this report cannot be inferred because the majority 
of the report has been redacted. 27 The report on Jehovah’s Witnesses 
was prompted by an Order in Council that made the organization 
illegal due to its anti-war sentiments. The report indicated widespread 
belief that pacifism could produce a defeatist attitude if left un-
checked.28 This report marked the growing interest of the RCMP 
intelligence gathering apparatus from enemy aliens, revolutionaries, 
saboteurs, and criminals to include pacifists and religious objectors.  
From 17th of February 1941 to the 1st of September 1945, the occur-
rence of reports about non-political groups expanded substantially. Of 
the thirty one available Bulletin issues during this latter half of World 
War Two, seventeen (fifty four per cent) of them contained at least 
one report about non-violent and politically unaligned groups (refer 
to Table). The number of groups studied also increased substantially, 
coming to include at least three additional religious sects (Eastern 
Rights Churches, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Menno-
nites) and three ethnic groups (Czechs, Slavs and Finns) as well as all 
26. George Buri, “‘Enemies Within Our Gates:’ Brandon’s Alien Detention Centre During the Great 
War,” Manitoba History 56 (2007): 5.
27. RCMP, 26 March 1940 Security Bulletin.
28. RCMP, 15 July 1940, Security Bulletin.
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of the groups discussed previously, except Hindus. 
 The documents from this era place special focus upon nation-
alist organizations in Canada, particularly when the nations were 
from European territories under military dispute. Reports about 
African Canadian people and Indigenous Canadians are conspicu-
ously absent. Though British forces were warring in Africa, and 
Native peoples might have been particularly receptive to socialist 
propaganda, neither group was ever reported upon in the Bulletins. 
Likely neither of those two groups were considered a wartime intel-
ligence problem, possibly due to the racist ideas of the RCMP ex-
pressed explicitly throughout the Bulletins, to be discussed in the 
following section. 
RCMP War Bulletins: Initiating Investigations 
The RCMP held an informal understanding of the character-
istics of different races of people, and devoted attention to individu-
als and organizations based upon negative stereotypes. Italian people 
were understood to be more ‘fanatical’ and less loyal in general than 
German people.29 This understanding resulted, generally, in natural-
ized and Canadian born Germans not being targeted by the RCMP 
intelligence apparatus, while all one hundred thousand Italian Cana-
dians were put under watch.30  
 It is possible that the RCMP investigators believed that 
European and Japanese people were more intelligent or capable of 
doing harm than Black and Native people, limiting or preventing 
intelligence gathering on them. Another possible explanation for the 
absence of information could be that these communities were small, 
and therefore may have presented less of a threat. It may also be pos-
sible that these groups and others were targeted in documents which 
are not available in this study. It is clear Europeans and small Chris-
tian denominations were the major targets of RCMP intelligence in 
the Bulletins, since the only two groups reported upon in the Bulletins 
that were not European, Christian or politically left aligned were the 
Japanese community and Hindu extremists in Canada.
29. RCMP, June-Sept 1939 Security Bulletin.
30. RCMP, 23 October 1939, Security Bulletin; RCMP, 6 May 1940, Security Bulletin.
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The investigations in the Bulletins were initiated due to 
subjects exhibiting one of the following characteristics: leaning left 
politically, engaging in criminal or disruptive behavior, holding fascist 
views, being an enemy alien, engaging in nationalist sentiment for 
non-commonwealth countries, and resisting the war effort. Discussed 
in the previous section, the Bulletins’ origins in the Criminal Inves-
tigation Bureau of the RCMP ensured the series included criminal 
activity and disruptive behavior.  It has also been previously estab-
lished that information gathering upon politically left aligned groups 
was extensive and has been studied in depth by Canadian academics 
such as Reg Whitaker. In general those in control of the RCMP intel-
ligence apparatus viewed the political left as a threat to the continu-
ation of the commonwealth government, and also as potential war 
effort saboteurs. Likewise, fascist ideologues and organizations were 
targeted because of their perceived disloyalty and threat to the Cana-
dian war effort.   
 The RCMP were given the task of monitoring enemy aliens 
because it was widely believed by government officials, the media and 
the Canadian public that these individuals were often members of 
secret societies dedicated to sabotaging the war effort.31 Due to the 
traditional commonwealth notion that one’s rights diminished pro-
portionally to the degree of non-British heritage, it was especially easy 
for the police to justify invasive investigations and arrests that would 
not have been acceptable against white Anglican Canadians of British 
ancestry.32 An enemy alien held citizenship in a country at war with 
Canada, but held residence inside Canada, leaving aliens completely 
unprotected legally.33 A considerable variety of sources, for instance 
Ken Adachi’s The Enemy that Never Was: A History of the Japanese Ca-
nadians, have delved into the common personal experiences of enemy 
aliens and internees in Canada. Due to the availability of this infor-
mation, these abuses will not be discussed at length, except to point 
out enemy aliens and internees had their privacy violated, property 
taken, and were often forced into manual labor. 
31. RCMP, 23 October 1939, Security Bulletin.
32. Sarah Ansari, “Subjects or Citizens? India, Pakistan and the 1948 British Nationality Act,” Journal of 
Imperial & Commonwealth History 41, no. 2 (2013): 290.




By the 16th of February 1941, displaying non-Canadian 
nationalism was grounds for RCMP investigation and Bulletin report-
ing. All three of the ethnicities put under surveillance following this 
date (Finns, Czechs and Slavs) were selected because of a recognizable 
increase in nationalistic activity attempting to benefit their mother 
country. The RCMP likely began considering foreign nationalism 
a good justification for initiating an investigation after discovering 
communists viewed nationalist organizations as “a language mass” 
working inevitably toward Leninist dictatorship.34 The police likely 
thought this was a credible communist threat to the commonwealth. 
Even nationalist organizations that unequivocally renounced all 
political affiliation and were specifically recognized as legal, such as 
the Finnish Organization of Canada or the Convention of Ukrainian 
Nationalist Organizations, were put under surveillance.35 Overall 
the RCMP appears to have over-reacted throughout this period 
and seized upon any connection to notorious persons or societies it 
could find. Often reports would indicate that a group (such as the 
Ukrainian lobby) was led by, or connected to, both communists and 
fascists, leaving the police unable to truly understand the purpose of 
the organizations. 
 The surveillance of the Eastern Rights Churches and the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church could have been prompted by its nationalist 
and ethnic distinction. Both of these groups had tangential connec-
tions to international communism, and so contradictorily investiga-
tions may have been initiated due to anti-left biases.36 These political 
connections were tenuous, and in the case of the Canadian Russian 
Orthodox Church they had been violently and permanently severed 
during the Communist revolution in Russia decades earlier, indicat-
ing more overreaction from the RCMP.37 During the fallout between 
the Russian Government and church, priests of the original Russian 
Orthodox Church had been jailed or killed by the incoming dicta-
torship. The modern international Russian Orthodox Church was 
erected by the fleeing bourgeoisie in their destination countries, such 
as Canada.38 Decades later, the Russian government recreated the 
34. RCMP, 17 February 1941, Security Bulletin.
35. RCMP, 1October 1944, Security Bulletin.
36. Whitaker, Secret Service, 157.
37. RCMP, 20 March 1941, Security Bulletin.
38. Ibid.
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Russian Orthodox Church as an officially legal religion locally, but 
this church was almost unanimously shunned by the new interna-
tional Russian Orthodox Church as simply a propaganda arm of the 
soviets, whom the international orthodox community held a grudge 
against.39  RCMP infiltration of large Eastern Rights Church events 
that were intentionally disassociated from all political subjects indi-
cates that police were simply ‘keeping tabs’ on ethnic events.40 
 The final justification for investigation initiation -resisting the 
war effort- is discernible from the late war Bulletin on Mennonites. In 
another attempt to summarize the history of a people into something 
useful to police, it was concluded that, by Order In Council of 1873, 
the Mennonites were exempted from compulsory military service.41 
This piece of information was important for the RCMP investigators 
because it indicated to them that no further action against the Men-
nonites was required. The Mennonites were never mentioned in the 
available Bulletins again, indicating that resisting the war effort was 
the factor that instigated the investigation- a resistance that had legal 
justification in this unique case.   
 The Bulletin reports regarding the Doukhobors and the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses summarize how those groups contributed to, 
or rallied against, the war effort. The RCMP reported upon a deal 
being brokered between the Doukhobors and the government con-
cerned with community service for Doukhobor adherents, as well as 
on Doukhobors that were convicted of not showing up for their war 
effort service.42 Two separate Bulletins commented upon the banning 
of the Jehovah’s Witness, first within Canada, and then within Sin-
gapore because of information obtained from the RCMP.43 Another 
report discussed the jailing of a Jehovah’s Witness who conducted an 
anti-war sermon in front of a veteran. The final report on Jehovah’s 
Witnesses during the war regarded an organized effort by adherents 
in Saskatchewan to conceal scrap metal from the war effort.44 Other 
sources suggest that the Jehovah’s Witnesses were initially targeted 
39. Ibid.
40. RCMP, 16 August 1941, Security Bulletin.
41. RCMP, 1March 1943, Security Bulletin.
42. RCMP, 19 June 1941 Security Bulletin; RCMP, 19 July 1941 Security Bulletin
43. RCMP, 15th July 1940, Security Bulletin; RCMP, 28th May 1941 Security Bulletin.
44. RCMP, 1st February 1943, Security Bulletin, 
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because of alleged connections to Nazism.45 It is clear that the RCMP 
did not target these groups because they held a minority religion, but 
rather because their minority religious views forced a small portion 
of them to speak out and act against the war effort. The police then 
viewed the whole community as a potential threat, and monitored 
them afterward accordingly.
Securitizing Race and Religion: Public Opinion and Covert 
Influence
 During World War Two, the police faced security speech acts 
from both internal and external sources. In 1939 Canada began 
centralizing its propaganda apparatus, drawing upon successful 
campaigns from World War One, and releasing posters identifying 
security issues to motivate the public.46 Certain campaigns had greater 
than intended effect, for instance in 1940 posters were distributed 
indicating that enemy spies were probably listening to citizens’ 
conversations at work to determine sabotage targets.47 There was also 
a public blacklisting of all German persons, and newspapers 
counseled against working with Germans due to the possibility of 
sabotage.48 The police during 1940 were thereafter swamped by 
useless tips about German saboteurs, sometimes a Teutonic haircut or 
having a Germanic sounding last name was enough to be reported to 
the police by the overzealous public.49 
 Following this, the RCMP contemplated enlisting the media 
to stop the nuisance calls, but never stated definitively a course of 
action on the matter.50 Some sources refer to this period in 1940 as 
the ‘fifth column scare’, because the threat was nonexistent in reality.51 
The RCMP identified that previously loyal and content German-
Canadians were becoming disheartened with the society that was 
shunning them. The RCMP Investigators determined a major cause 
of the new unrest among Germans to be the Canadian security speech 
45. Whitaker, Secret Service, 159.
46. “Second World War” Collections Canada,
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/posters-broadsides/026023-7200-e.html.
47. “Méfiez-vous” Collections Canada,
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/posters-broadsides/026023-7200-e.html.
48. RCMP, 15 July 1940, Security Bulletin.
49. RCMP, 10 June 1940, Security Bulletin.
50. Ibid.
51. Whitaker, Secret Service, 161.
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acts, stating “it is only natural that one reaps what he sows.”52 The 
same Bulletin also notes that Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe 
publicly demanded oversight of wartime law enforcement in order to 
combat the persecution of minorities.53 
 After this, the RCMP and government changed tactics 
regarding race relations. Government propaganda became more 
inclusive of the varied communities in Canada and some war bond 
posters were printed in foreign languages.54  Other posters began 
promoting social cohesiveness, the necessity of the war effort, and the 
need for everyone to contribute.55 Also indicative of the change in 
tact was a recommendation made in the Bulletins after Pearl Harbor 
to diminish anti-Japanese media, using censorship if necessary.56 In 
every Bulletin previous to December 1941 that mentioned the 
Japanese, police reiterated the supportive nature of Japanese 
Canadians to the war effort, noting special contributions from 
Japanese organizations in excess of two thousand dollars.57 The 
RCMP and the government were clearly concerned about alienating 
the compliant Japanese, as they had inadvertently done to Germans a 
year earlier. Furthermore, the RCMP decided to not allow the 
Japanese to stew in the public’s distrust as they had the Germans, 
breeding potential saboteurs who could freely roam the countryside, 
and thereafter shifted strategy from attempting not to alienate 
Japanese citizens to containing them. 
 The RCMP did not change all of their tactics after their 
German-Canadian issues, only the ones visible to the public. Instead 
of ending all secret race based investigations, the investigators 
redoubled their efforts to monitor minorities, expanding their scope 
to include persons of non-enemy nationhood.  Renewed focus was 
also placed upon saboteurs, pacifists and persons evading wartime 
contributions, as discussed in a previous section. It can be inferred 
that these new race based investigations were initiated due to internal 
governmental speech acts, since there was no popular movement 
52. RCMP, 10 June 1940, Security Bulletin.
53. Ibid.
54. “Buy Victory Bonds (Chinese)” Collections Canada, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/posters-
broadsides/026023-7200-e.html.
55. “Coal Face” Collections Canada, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/posters-broadsides/026023-
7200-e.html .
56. RCMP, 24 December 1941, Security Bulletin.
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against the minorities, nor an inciting external event like Pearl 
Harbor.  
 The Canadian Government at the time was paranoid about a 
possible war at home on two fronts.58 Those in positions of power had 
feared sabotage and labor unrest since before the outbreak of the war, 
particularly among foreigners.59 It can be inferred that after several 
years of investigating, placing into concentration camps, and 
monitoring enemy aliens without a single serious case of sabotage, 
authorities decided to put new focus upon other powerful ethnic 
groups in Canada. This was likely considered to be a part of the “new 
conception of police” as the first line of “Civil Home Defense” 
necessitated by wartime.60 Were an act of sabotage to occur for any 
reason, it would be considered a direct failure of the RCMP 
intelligence apparatus. The Bulletins indicate larger attempts to 
monitor railways, docks, canal junctions, and anyone who frequented 
them by posting guards in an attempt to prevent such unforeseen 
failure.61  
 There are clear parallels between the securitization of 
immigrants, pacifists, and shipping during World War Two and the 
modern securitization of Muslims, the Internet, and travel post 
September 11th 2001. In both instances, the securitization of novel 
jurisdictions (such as religious or nationalist identity) was prompted 
by a war in which a minority population of Canada became suspect 
due to ties to their home countries or because of their radical beliefs. 
Another paralleled development is the use of the public to identify 
malcontents. The anti-German campaigning and tip-lines established 
during World War Two typified by the poster “Méfiez-vous” have 
already been discussed. Modern Montreal has decided to likewise start 
up a terrorism tipline.62 This project is proceeding despite the past 
Canadian failure of  “Méfiez-vous”, and the modern failure of the 
American ‘See something Say Something’ Campaign in 2010 to do 
anything except implicate innocent people.63 It is also not clear what 
58. “They Menace Canada on Both Coasts” Collections Canada, 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/posters-broadsides/026023-7200-e.html.
59. RCMP, June-Sept 1939, Security Bulletin.
60. RCMP, 26 August 1940, Security Bulletin.
61. Ibid.
62. Alan Woods “Montreal creates radicalization tip line to flag city’s extremists,” 9 March, 2015, The 
Star.
63. “ACLU: Innocent Americans targeted in ‘see something, say something’ campaign,” ABC News, Sep-
tember 19, 2013, http://www.news10.net/news/article/257963/2/ACLU-Innocent-Americans-targeted-
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difference the Montreal tipline will have, since in 2015 
Communications Security Establishment (CSE) publicly stated it is 
‘drowning in data’ and has been left without resources to follow leads, 
just as CSIS was in World War Two.64 
 There are no instances on record either in the distant past or 
present day of metadata collection resulting in significant detection of 
a serious subversive or terrorist threat. The American spy apparatus 
claims to have prevented a large number of terrorist acts, but under 
scrutiny this claim falls apart.65 Some claim as little as one percent of 
those ‘caught’ using metadata collection in modern America were 
likely to do harm.66 This line of reasoning is confirmed by established 
academia available regarding the history of intelligence gathering 
agencies. There is an almost universal recognition in academia of 
systemic incompetence and corruption inside intelligence gathering 
apparatus. Noted Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) historian Tim 
Weiner likens the history of the CIA to a “Legacy of Ashes,”, where 
incompetence and corruption force the destruction and reformation 
of the agency at regular intervals.67 This is the same general process 
undergone by the Canadian intelligence apparatus until the end of 
World War Two, marked by the considerable turnover of high level 
positions.68  Arguably the same process has continued to occur in 
Canada as well, evident from continued modification of intelligence 
agencies like CSE.69  
 The incompetence and biases of the RCMP were so obvious 
in World War Two that many of those people contemporaneously 
receiving Bulletin updates stated the RCMP were “out of their 
depth.”70 Henry Ferns has remarked upon his time working for 
Mackenzie King in 1940, stating that the Canadian intelligence 
in-see-something-say-something-campaign.
64. “CSE’s Levitation project: Expert says spy agencies ‘drowning in data’ and unable to follow leads: 
U.S. reports question effectiveness of bulk collection in hunt for terrorists,” Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, January 29, 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cse-s-levitation-project-expert-says-spy-
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service “was characterized by boneheaded stupidity.”71 One 
particularly detailed contemporaneous review of RCMP intelligence 
by Jack Pickersgill remarked that the police were unable to determine 
the difference between hearsay and facts, nor between subversion and 
political criticism.72 Modern critics have likewise been known to find 
RCMP intelligence gathering during the War on Terror to be 
simultaneously laughable due to their incompetence, and scary due to 
their extensive powers.73    
 Other historians, such as Alfred McCoy in his book The 
Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, have 
focused particularly on the counter-productive nature of spy agencies 
with different goals than those supposedly directing them. This was 
also experienced by Canada specifically during World War Two, as the 
Minister of Justice rallied against the racist and unjust methods of 
intelligence gathering being used by the RCMP.74 It is widely 
recognized that most intelligence accumulated in secrecy is useless, an 
idea confirmed by examination of the Bulletins.75 Findings made by 
security apparatus typically have little influence on policy decisions, 
and instead have the greatest effect upon tactics used in warfare and 
international relations.76 
 Canada’s first spy agency was created due to securitizing 
pressures during World War Two resulting in infringements upon 
personal freedoms that were recognized and rebuked during the war 
by several influential sources, including the Minister of Justice at the 
time. Another important source of dissent was future Prime Minister 
and contemporary parliamentarian John Diefenbaker.77 Such 
sentiments only grew in intensity after the war ended and the 
concentration camps were uncovered. Many average Canadians 
became deeply disturbed by the former race based concentration 
camps in Canada, which were in theory very similar to the European 
camps, aside from Hitler’s genocidal final solution for dealing with 
71. Ibid, 171.
72. Ibid, 172.
73. Paul Hanley, “RCMP ‘intelligence’ a danger to Canada,” Times Colonist March 6, 2015.
74. RCMP, 10 June 1940, Security Bulletin. 
75. Paul Robinson, “Viability of a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service, The New Perspective on Cana-
dian Security Studies,” International Journal 64 (2009): 705.
76. Ibid, 706.
77. John Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker The Crusading 
Years 1895-1956 (Toronto: Macmillan 1975), 223.
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those inside the camps. The sentiment against infringing upon the 
freedoms of Canadians was continually presented by John 
Diefenbaker until he became the Prime Minister of a majority 
government, and passed the Bill of Rights 1960.78 This document was 
intended to be a permanent constitutional protection of human rights 
in Canada, in order to prevent the abuses perpetrated by the 
government from occurring again.  
 Diefenbaker was unsuccessful in his endeavor to create a 
constitutional protection with the Bill of Rights 1960 due to technical 
reasons. Canada did not yet have the power to unilaterally amend its 
constitution, and so the Bill of Rights 1960 held no more legal force 
than average legislation. His dream was fulfilled in 1982, when the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was passed, based almost completely 
upon The Bill of Rights 1960. This means the tactics utilized in World 
War Two that prompted The Bill of Rights 1960 must be 
unconstitutional under The Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Any 
inflammatory tactic utilized during World War Two that is identified 
as in use by the modern intelligence apparatus should be declared 
illegal if challenged in the Supreme Court of Canada.  
 Since there are several tactics that can be readily identified, 
such as racial and religious profiling, indiscriminate intelligence 
gathering, a lack of consideration for the human rights of detainees, 
this would make a compelling future challenge. Profiling based upon 
race is “undeniably” occurring during Canada’s war on terror, 
resulting in Arabic persons being heavily targeted by the intelligence 
apparatus.79  Those who stand accused or suspected of terrorism are 
not always given a fair trial; instead the person may be given over to 
foreign governments to be tortured and permanently detained. 80 
 Omar Khadr, a Canadian born Arab who was pushed into 
service for Al Qaeda by his parents as a child, was captured by 
American forces in Afghanistan and transferred to Guantanamo Bay 
prison camp for a decade without a fair trial.81 During this period the 
78. John Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker The Years of 
Achievement 1957-1962 (Toronto: Macmillan 1976), 31.
79. Rheem Bahdi “No Exit: Racial Profiling and Canada’s War on Terror” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 41 
no. 2&3 (2003): 294.
80. “Alleged Afghan prison torture controversy slips quietly into history books,” CBC March 10, 2015, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/alleged-afghan-prison-torture-controversy-slips-quietly-into-history-
books-1.2567308 (accessed February 10, 2015.) 




Canadian government did not attempt to extract or protect Khadr, as 
it was their legal responsibility to do for a citizen such as himself, 
particularly as he was a child.82 The Canadian government has even 
passed legislation that now allows them to formally strip convicted 
terrorists of their Canadian citizenship.83 Though Arabic Canadians 
may have legal citizenship, it is a second-class version which can be 
disregarded and lost, not the substantive citizenship held by other 
Canadians which can be called upon to vouchsafe rights.84 The entire 
situation is strikingly similar to the treatment of Germans, Italians 
and the Japanese during World War Two. Japanese Canadian citizens 
also suffered from a lack of substantive citizenship, and were rounded 
up and placed into work camps for years without trial because of a 
single major attack upon an American target by persons who looked 
like them. 
 The indiscriminate surveillance of the Canadian populace is 
another important parallel tactic used in the past and the present. It 
has already been noted that the police during World War Two 
attempted to install extra security at travel hubs in order to gather 
intelligence upon those people utilizing them. The police have done 
the same in the modern day, far beyond the scope imagined by their 
predecessors. Modern intelligence gatherers have been known to tap 
into people’s computers through airport wifi, and even listen to 
telephone conversations in direct contradiction of firmly established 
Canadian law.85 Investigators during World War Two were satisfied 
with placing every person of foreign ancestral origin under 
surveillance, whereas modern intelligence agencies track everyone 
both foreign and domestic.86 The Canadian Intelligence gathering 
82. Gerald Caplan “It’s the Harper government vs. Omar Khadr, again” The Globe and Mail May 29 
2015 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/its-the-harper-government-vs-omar-khadr-again/
article24708596/ 
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apparatus even watches social media for suspicious activity.87 It is clear 
that not only are modern intelligence gathering services utilizing the 
same methods and tactics to gain information as their predecessors in 
World War Two, they are using them even more powerfully and 
egregiously.  
 The Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 sections 1a and b which 
protect “the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the 
person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except by due process of law… (and) the right of the 
individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law” 
were drafted in response to the human rights abuses perpetrated by 
the Canadian Government in World War Two.88 Matching clauses 
exist in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, sections 7 to 9 protect 
legal rights and read:  “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Everyone 
has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned.”89 Section 15(1) of the Charter protects equality in 
Canada:  
 
 Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the  
 right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law   
 without discrimination and, in particular, without    
 discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,   
 colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.90 
It is self-evident that modern police profiling, mass surveillance and 
governmental disregard for the rights of prisoners and citizens do not 
meet the constitutional and moral standards set by the Bill of Rights 
and the Charter.   
 In the future as more modern documents become available 
scholars should attempt to further identify the origins of modern 
87. Don Butler, “Watching Canada’s suspected terrorists: The lists our authorities keep” Ottawa Citizen 
January 13 2015 http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/understanding-the-rcmps-terror-watch-list.
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(accessed July 31 2015)
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police tactics, both for the sake of historical preservation of 
knowledge and as an attempt to constrain the avarice of the Canadian 
government to expand its dominion. Knowing where a tactic 
originated from, and the results garnered from previous use, can help 
to assess the quality of that tactic. Canadian decision making bodies 
would greatly benefit from increased historical knowledge about 
the history of intelligence gathering, a subject which is still largely 
unexplored academically. Modern citizens, media and politicians 
will never be able to adequately understand and utilize intelligence 
gathering until historians sufficiently understand the history of how 
those intelligence apparatus’ formed, operated and the legacy they 
left.  
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